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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
to find that grandchildren included more remote descendants. The Court rea-
soned that where the language is clear and unambiguous there must be a
clear showing of unmistakeable intent to the contrary to raise a construction
problem.
The three dissenting judges stated that the intent as found in the whole
will was controlling and that there did appear an overall stirpital intent which
was contrary to the limitation over to "my grandchildren then living." The
dissent, accordingly, would have allowed the descendants of the deceased
grandchildren to share with the grandchildren who survived the life tenant.
P. D.C.
TRUST DISPOSITION, NOT AMBIGUOUS, NOT CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE AFTER-
ADOPTED CIIILDREN
In In re Ricks' Trust,"y the Court of Appeals construed a provision of
Section 115 of the Domestic Relations Law as restricting the over-all purpose
of the section; that of enlarging on the rights of adopted children.
The action was for construction of a trust agreement. The agreement
provided for the income from the trust to go to James Ricks during his life,
then to his descendants during a secondary measuring life, and the remainder
to his descendants. At the time the trust was created in 1950 James Ricks had
only natural born children. Subsequently he adopted children, thus giving
rise to the question of whether the adopted children are entitled to share in
the trust income during the secondary measuring life along with the natural
born children.
The Appellate Division held that they were not so entitled.' 8 In general,
a limitation in favor of "issue" or "descendants" will be construed to include
only persons who have a blood relationship to the ancestor. 10 Only when the
instrument itself, or certain extraneous facts show contrary intent, will the
words be held to include adopted children. In this case the word "descendants"
is used in the same manner in other clauses of the agreement, and this, along
with provisions for distribution per stirpes, reflects concern only with regard
to the blood lines. The Appellate Division noted that
It has been consistently held in similar circumstances, .where a
child has been adopted after the death of the testator, that the adopted
child does not fall within the class of persons designated as "issue" or
"descendants" in the will.
20
The Appellate Division also distinguished the present case from In re
17. 10 N.Y.2d 231, 219 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1961).
18. 12 A.D.2d 395, 212 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1st Dep't 1961).
19. 3 Powell, Real Property 132 (1952); New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Vicle,
161 N.Y. 11, 55 N.E. 311 (1899).
20. Supra note 18 at 397, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 548. See In re Peabody's Will, 17 Misc. 2d
656, 185 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Surr. Ct. 1959); In re Cook's Will, 8 Misc. 2d 103, 165 N.Y.S.2d
806 (Surr. Ct. 1957) ; In re Hilt's Estate, 5 Misc. 2d 862, 160 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Surr. Ct. 1957),
aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 1013, 168 N.Y.S.2d 925 (ist Dep't 1957).
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Upjohn's Will21 and In re Ward's Will,22 upon which appellants relied. In the
Upjohn case the testator knew of the adoption prior to the making of the will.
In the Ward case the child was adopted after the will was drafted, but testi-
mony showed that the testatrix favored adopted children generally, had advo-
cated the adoption of children by her daughter, and desired to treat all three
of her children equally in disposing of her estate.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division for the reasons
which that court stated, and in addition held that since "the language of the
instrument directs distribution in the same verbiage which is employed in
directing the passing of the remainder at the termination of the trust,"23 the
settlor probably did not intend different meanings to be attached to the same
verbiage in different parts of the instrument. Thus, Section 115 of the Domes-
tic Relations Law, paragraph four, which provides that
As respects the passing and limitation over of real or personal
property dependent under the provisions of any instrument on the
foster parent dying without heirs, the foster child is not deemed the
child of the foster parents so as to defeat the rights of remaindermen,
applies to the trust income during the secondary measuring life as well as to
the remainder, and only the natural born children are entitled to share in
trust income.
The Court of Appeals, in this decision, has succeeded in narrowing the
intended coverage of Section 115, which was designed to broaden the personal
and real property rights of adopted children.24 Indeed, this is the main fault
which the dissent finds with the majority opinion.
25
Judge Fuld, in dissent, argued that the public policy of the state was to
enlarge upon, not restrict, the rights of adopted children; that the word "de-
scendants" was not ambiguous in the present instrument since the settlor used
it to describe the legal successors of James Ricks, which included adopted
children;26 that if it was ambiguous, the fourth paragraph of Section 115 was
not applicable since it was intended to operate only on the contingency of the
foster parent dying without heirs and was designed to prevent fraud, neither
of which conditions existed here; and that if there was an ambiguity it was
resolved by the settlor's affidavit stating that if there had been any adopted
children in 1950, or if the question had arisen, she would have included them
in the trust as it was not her intention to exclude adopted children. As to the
affidavit, the Appellate Division correctly noted that it should only be admitted
to resolve an ambiguity,2 7 and the court found none. Furthermore, the fact
21. 304 N.Y. 366, 107 N.E.2d 492 (1952).
22. 9 N.Y.2d 722, 214 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1961).
23. Supra note 17 at 234, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
24. Supra note 21 at 373, 107 N.E.2d at 494.
25. Supra note 17 at 234, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
26. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 83.
27. 2 Scott, Trusts 1158-1159 (2d ed. 1956); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2471 (3d ed.
1940); Annot. 51 A.L.R.2d 820 (1955).
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that the settlor states in the affidavit that had the problem arisen in 1950 she
would have made provisions in the instrument for adopted children, indicates
that the possibility of an adopted child had never occurred to her when the
word "descendants" was used.
It seems that except for the affidavit, the dissent's points are well taken.
The courts take a step backward when they narrowly construe a statute to
arrive at a conclusion opposed to the stated public policy of the state. Given
that public policy, the Court should not have enlarged upon a restriction in
the statute that was intended to be a limited one. Nor should it have so nar-
rowly construed the word "descendants," for, as the dissent pointed out, a
construction more in keeping with public policy was available. Given the
decision, however, it appears that it would be wise to consider the possibility
of adopted children and make appropriate provisions, when drawing up a will
or trust agreement.
T. C. L.
INTEREST oF REmAINDERmAN PREDECEASING LIFE TENANT VESTED SUBJECT
TO DIVESTMENT
In In re Larkin's Will28 the Surrogate's Court held that the interest of a
remainderman dying prior to the life tenant was divested by his death and his
share passed to his children. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the
remainder interest was indefeasibly vested and was not contingent upon the
remainderman surviving the life tenant. 29 The Court of Appeals reversed the
Appellate Division and reinstated the decree of the Surrogate's Court.30
The third paragraph of testator's will bequeathed a life estate to his wife
and disposed of the remainder interest in the following language: "I give,
devise and bequeath said residence property and the furnishings in the resi-
dence thereon, at the death of my said wife, Catherine C. Larkin, to my three
sons ... ,share and share alike." The fourth paragraph set up a trust fund
for his wife with two of the sons as trustees and provided: "At her death, my
said trustees shall divide the securities and balance then remaining in their
hands.. . ." The eleventh paragraph stated: "In the event that any of my
said sons should die leaving descendants, said descendants shall take the share
of any such deceased son, per stirpes and not per capita."
One of the remaindermen predeceased the life tenant survived by a widow
and three children. His will provided that his widow was to take his entire
estate. The contest is between the widow and one of the children of the
remainderman. Under the construction adopted by the Appellate Division the
remainder interest became property of the remainderman at the death of the
testator and passed to his widow under the terms of his will.
28. 9 N.Y.2d 88, 211 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1961).
29. 11 A.D.2d 596, 200 N.Y.S.2d 565 (3d Dep't 1960).
30. Supra note 28.
